Jared R. Flake

EDUCATION

Boston College, Carroll School of Management   *Chestnut Hill, MA*
  Ph.D. in Accounting   Dec 2023
  Advisors: Mark Bradshaw, Lian Fen Lee, and Miao Liu
Brigham Young University, Marriott School of Business   *Provo, UT*
  Master of Accountancy   2018
  B.S., Accounting   2018
  Minor, Economics   2018

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Northeastern University, D'Amore-McKim School of Business   *Boston, MA*
  Visiting Assistant Professor   2023-Present

RESEARCH

I am broadly interested in the intersection of voluntary disclosure and sell-side analysts.

Working Papers (* denotes presentation by coauthor)
"Why Do Managers Interact with Unfavorable Analysts during Earnings Calls?"
(Job Market Paper)
- Committee: Mark Bradshaw (Chair), Lian Fen Lee, Miao Liu
- Presented at BYU Accounting Research Symposium 2022, AAA/Deloitte Foundation/J Michael Cook 2022 Doctoral Consortium, Boston College, 2022 Accounting PhD Rookie Camp, Indiana University, AAA Annual Meeting

"Predictability of Analyst Stock Recommendation Revisions" (with Mark Bradshaw and Mark Piorkowski)
- Presented at BYU Accounting Research Symposium 2021, FARS Midyear Meeting 2022*, Deakin University*, CeFARR 3rd Analyst Research Conference 2022*, CUHK*, Emory University*

"Analysts' Role in Managerial Learning: Evidence from Analyst Activity around M&A Announcements" (with Farzana Afrin)
- Presented at Boston College

Work in Progress
"Disclosure Processing and Investor Reliance on Analyst Research: Evidence from Concurrent Earnings Announcements and 10-K Filings"
- Presented at Boston College

PROFESSIONAL SERVICE

Ad-Hoc Conference Reviewer: AAA Annual Meeting (2020, 2022, 2023)
Discussant: Boston Empirical Accounting Conference (2019)

CONFERENCE PARTICIPATION

AAA Annual Meeting	2021, 2023
Accounting PhD Rookie Camp	2022
BYU Accounting Research Symposium	2016, 2017, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022
FARS Midyear Meeting	2021, 2022

CONFERENCE PARTICIPATION (cont.)

AAA/Deloitte Foundation/J Michael Cook 2022 Doctoral Consortium 2022
Duke Accounting Theory Summer School 2022
Boston Empirical Accounting Conference 2018, 2019, 2021
FARS Doctoral Consortium 2021
BYU SAS Boot Camp 2017

TEACHING

Northeastern University, D'Amore-McKim School of Business	*Boston, MA*
Financial Accounting and Reporting (ACCT 1201, undergraduate)	2023
Managerial Accounting (ACCT 2301, undergraduate)	2023 – 2024

TEACHING AND OTHER RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Boston College, Carroll School of Management	*Chestnut Hill, MA*
Financial Accounting (TA, Natalie Berfeld, Ki-Soon Choi, and Ben Yost)	2022, 2023
Dive, Dissect and Decide with Big Business Data (TA, Alvis Lo)	2020, 2021, 2022
Financial Accounting Standards and Theory (TA, Lian Fen Lee)	2020, 2021
Managerial Cost Analysis (TA, Jeff Cohen)	2019
Brigham Young University, Marriott School of Business	*Provo, UT*
Research Assistant for Mike Drake	2017-2018
Corporate Finance for MAcc (TA, Karl Diether)	2017
Introductory Economics (TA, James Kearl)	2015

OTHER PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Polaris Industries (Treasury Intern)	2017
Platinum Dental Care (Accountant)	2016 – 2017
English3 (Accountant)	2014 – 2017
Office of Senator Jeff Flake (Congressional Intern)	2014

AWARDS/HONORS

Excellence in Reviewing Award: AAA Annual Meeting	2020
Scholarship from the BYU Chapter of the Institute of Management Accountants	2017
Academic Scholarship, Brigham Young University (Half-Tuition)	2013-2017
Dean's List Brigham Young University, Marriott School of Business	2013

REFERENCES

Mark Bradshaw (Chair)	Lian Fen Lee
Professor of Accounting, Department Chair	Associate Professor of Accounting
Boston College	Boston College
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mark.bradshaw@bc.edu	lianfen.lee@bc.edu
Amy Hutton	Miao Liu
Professor of Accounting	Assistant Professor of Accounting
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Paper Abstracts

"Why Do Managers Interact with Unfavorable Analysts during Earnings Calls?" (Job Market Paper)

Managers prioritize questions from favorable analysts during earnings announcement conference calls, reinforcing analysts' incentives to be optimistic. However, managers also interact with unfavorable analysts on calls, and, when they do, absolute announcement returns are larger. I seek to understand why managers interact with unfavorable analysts. I find that unfavorable analysts attenuate their negative views after these interactions with managers. Additionally, the stock price response is stronger for forecasts from managers who regularly interact with unfavorable analysts, consistent with enhanced credibility of these managers. Finally, I use peer firm restatement announcements as exogenous shocks to investors' assessment of a firm's accounting quality, and I find that nonrestating firms with managers who regularly interact with unfavorable analysts experience attenuated negative returns, relative to nonrestating peers. Overall my findings are consistent with managers' interactions with unfavorable analysts providing significant benefits to the firm, such as resolving concerns and increasing investors' perceptions of manager credibility.

"Predictability of Analyst Stock Recommendation Revisions" (with Mark Bradshaw and Mark Piorkowski)

On average, analysts' stock recommendation revisions have immediate effects on stock prices. However, recent research indicates that only a small subset of recommendations are influential in the sense that they are associated with significant returns. Given the relative infrequency of recommendation revisions compared to other analyst output, we expect that analysts predictably signal future recommendation revisions through changes in the tone of sequential research reports and quantitative forecasts. Consistent with our expectation, we find that future recommendation revisions are positively associated with the signed change in analyst report tone, expected returns implied from target prices, and target price revisions. To test whether the predictability of recommendation revisions preempts market reactions when revisions are announced, we construct a predictability measure using changes in research report tone, analysts' quantitative output, and firm characteristics. We find that our predictability measure is associated with attenuated market reactions to recommendation upgrades and a lower likelihood that the upgrades are classified as influential. We also find that our recommendation revision prediction model is better at predicting upgrades than downgrades and has similar performance to prediction models in other settings in the literature predicting rare events, such as fraud prediction models.

"Analysts' Role in Managerial Learning: Evidence from Analyst Activity around M&A Announcements" (with Farzana Afrin)

We examine the impact of sell-side analysts' research on the re-evaluation of M&A deals. We construct and use a measure of analyst tone to examine the soft information contained in a large sample of 14,000 analyst reports issued shortly after M&A deal announcements. We find that a more positive analyst tone is associated with a higher likelihood of deal completion, consistent with deal participants learning from analyst reports. Moreover, the effect is stronger when analysts have more experience covering the firms involved in the deal, and when there is greater managerial uncertainty surrounding the deal. We also find that more positive analyst reports are associated with a shorter time to deal completion. Last, we find that more positive analyst reports are associated with fewer target shareholder activist campaigns opposing the deal, consistent with target shareholders learning from analyst reports. Overall, our findings suggest that key decision-makers learn about the merits of the deal from analysts.