Henry Tolleson is a fourth-year student at Northeastern University studying International Business, and a CEM Student Associate. His reflection centers on remarks by Naveen Srivastava, Ambassador of India to Nepal from June 25, 2022, to October 1, 2026, at CEM's fifth annual Vivek and Vandana Sharma India Summit, “Can India Become a Global Manufacturing Hub?”, held on October 5, 2026.
Before Ambassador Naveen Srivastava's session, I assumed India's manufacturing strategy was mostly about building domestic capacity and cutting reliance on China. His talk made clear that India is building that capacity while still depending heavily on China for the inputs its factories need.
Growth Built on Chinese Inputs
Manufacturing currently makes up around 15% of India's GDP, and the government is targeting 25% by 2047. Srivastava noted that a recent change to the GDP baseline makes older comparisons tricky, though, under the previous measure, manufacturing's share would be closer to 18%. Under government policies such as the Production Linked Incentive Scheme, which rewards companies for meeting production targets across 14 sectors, India has become the world's second-largest mobile phone maker, and many iPhones sold in the US are now assembled there.
Not all manufacturing sectors, however, have performed equally well. Further up the supply chain in sectors such as batteries and solar panels, India still relies on China for chips, battery materials, and the rare earths and graphite that feed into many products. India's advanced chemistry cell battery program, for example, had realized only about 1.4 gigawatt-hours of a 50 gigawatt-hour target when he spoke, largely because of delays in getting materials and equipment from China. Hearing that number made the gap between policy goals and supply realities concrete for me.
Srivastava asserted that trade with China has not shrunk as India's manufacturing has grown. Rather, it has shifted from finished products to components for goods made in India. Like the conventional wisdom he described, I had assumed a falling trade deficit would signal progress. Under this pattern, the trade deficit has doubled even as India builds more at home, because the country is buying more of the inputs it needs to produce for export.
Diversifying Beyond China
To reduce its dependence on China and build a more resilient manufacturing network, India is pursuing partnerships with the United States, Japan, South Korea, the European Union, and the United Kingdom. This diversification plan sounded more credible as a long-term project than a quick fix, and Srivastava admitted it will take years. I think building a network of trusted suppliers, rather than swapping one dependence for another, is the right goal.
Kellee Tsai, Dean of Northeastern's College of Social Sciences and Humanities and moderator of the session, asked whether India could use its large market to win technology transfers the way China did in recent decades. Srivastava said the market is still a real bargaining chip, though the global climate is less forgiving than when China industrialized. In his view, companies now want diversified supply chains, and India is well placed to benefit.
Additional Takeaways
One of my main takeaways from Srivastava's session was a question about whether a country can build a trusted manufacturing base while depending on the country it is trying to hedge against. He thinks it can, but it will take time. I would want to see India's new partnerships deliver before calling it a strategy, and I expect the real test will be whether the parts actually arrive.
Henry Tolleson
D'Amore-McKim School of Business, '27